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Abstract: 
The recent turmoil in North African and Middle Eastern countries has, at various degrees, 
affected Chinese investments in these regions, as well as the security of Chinese citizens abroad. 
During its fieldwork in Beijing and Hangzhou from February till June 2011, the author had the 
opportunity to get a hint of the ongoing debate on risk assessment practices of Chinese firms 
investing in Africa. This article aims to illustrate some major aspects of this ongoing debate, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent turmoil in North African and Middle Eastern countries has, at various degrees, 
affected Chinese investments in these regions, as well as the security of Chinese citizens abroad. 
During our fieldwork in Beijing and Hangzhou from February till June 2011, we had the 
opportunity to get a hint of the debate on risk assessment practices of Chinese firms investing 
in Africa. This article aims to illustrate some major aspects of this ongoing debate, hoping to 
stimulate further discussion. Before addressing the core topic of this article, we will introduce 
some preliminary concepts related to political risk.  
2. POLITICAL RISK 
For multinational companies, political risk refers to the risk that a host country will make 
political decisions which prove to have adverse effects on the multinational's profits and/or 
goals, provoking strategic, financial or personnel losses. Political risk is related to changes in 
macroeconomic and social policies (such as fiscal, monetary, trade, investment, industrial, 
income, labor and developmental policies) or to political instability (terrorist attacks, riots, 
coups, civil wars and insurrections). 1  While in developed countries political risk due 
to regulatory excesses usually prevails, in developing countries political risk is often linked to 
structural risks. These might include regime instability, out-of-sync economic policies and 
ethno-religious-cultural imbalances in development, due to the monopoly of political power 
and economic wealth by a single dominant ethnic or religious group. 
Political risk related to political instability in developing countries is indeed the focus of this 
article. Its relevance has recently been increased by the financial crisis, which has brought 
rising levels of unemployment, declining remittances and, due to shrinking government 
revenues, it has limited resources available for social programs. The risk of social unrest has 
therefore increased, as both movements of protest in developed countries (i.e. Indignados, 
Occupy Wall Street) and often more violent revolts in low-income countries have shown. 
Although uprisings in North Africa and Middle East have caught the attention of the media, 
other protests, such as famine riots, have indeed been endemic in several Sub-Saharan African 
countries since 2008.  
Political risk indexes are often based on indicators of one country’s stability, defined as “the 
ability of the government to implement policies and enforce laws despite a shock to the 
system.”2 Indeed, some of the most politically stable states are also the most authoritarian. The 
correlation between political stability and political freedom is therefore not straightforward. A 
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low level of political risk related to political instability in a given country does not necessarily 
correspond to a high degree of political freedom. However, political change in authoritarian 
regimes is likely to be particularly disruptive for investors in the country, as the case of the 
unexpected regime overturn in Libya clearly shows. Being shocks by definition unpredictable, 
political risk remains particularly difficult to monitor, assess and forecast. Firms trying to 
lessen their exposure to political risk can therefore rely on different strategies, including 
in-deep analysis and planning before undertaking the investment, enhanced understanding of 
local business practices and regulations, investment diversification and purchase of political 
risk insurances. The establishment of joint ventures (JV) with local companies can also provide 
the foreign firm with a better knowledge of the local cultural, legal and business environment. 
Another common practice among foreign investors is the establishment of good relations with 
host governments, local communities and NGOs. Nevertheless, close ties with local political 
elites in charge might obviously aggravate the position of a foreign firm in case of an 
unforeseen political overturn. Besides these prevention strategies, firms can also adopt 
country-exit and/or damage reduction strategies, in an attempt to alleviate the consequences of 
a crisis.  
Having defined the main features of political risk, we will now focus on specific practices of 
Chinese firms investing abroad. 
3. CHINESE FIRMS AND POLITICAL RISK 
According to the “World Investment and Political Risk Report 2009”, Chinese investors are 
aware of political risk and, compared to other North-based and South-based investors, they are 
concerned in particular with risks related to political violence, namely war, civil disturbance 
and terrorism.3 There is indeed empirical evidence that Chinese firms are less adverse to 
political risk compared to Western counterparts, which can be explained by several factors. 
Chinese companies, as latecomers to Africa, may attempt to take advantage of the opportunities 
presented by high-risk countries, such as first-mover advantages, lower competition and lower 
level of consumer sophistication. As a Chinese official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) said, “we would like to go to democratic countries with good human rights records and 
good business environment but the problem is that we are latecomers on the African continent 
and that many of the opportunities in those countries have been taken by Western 
first-comers.”4 The choice of the investment location for Chinese firms in the extractive sector 
is moreover bound by the geography of mineral deposits, letting them with even less room for 
maneuver. In several cases, moreover, potential economic benefits for Chinese firms investing 
in unstable countries are high enough to be regarded as offsetting political risks. Research 
results also show that Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) tend to be less risk-adverse 
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than Chinese private firms.5 SOEs in fact, conditioned by the institutional influence of the 
Chinese government, may not behave solely as profit maximizers. Thanks to the financial 
support of Chinese state banks, they might indeed be able to undertake higher risks.6 Moreover, 
compared to the majority of Chinese private companies, SOEs can take better advantage of the 
friendly relations between the Chinese government and several African host governments, 
which allows them to operate in a more secure business environment. 
A striking 18% of the Chinese companies which participated to the MIGA’s survey admits not 
to take any measure against political risk. This is the highest percentage among South-based 
investors and it is three times higher than the world average. The main reasons seem to be lack 
or unawareness of appropriate tools to offset political risk.7 Most of the firms that participated 
in the survey where SOEs. We can therefore assume that, among Small Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs), the percentage of firms undertaking extremely limited political risk-avoidance 
measures (or no measure at all) is much higher, since SMEs have even more limited human and 
financial means at their disposal to invest in these activities. 
Among those firms trying to diminish their exposure to political risk, the main risk mitigation 
tool employed is political risk analysis, followed by the creation of joint ventures with local 
companies and the establishment of good relations with host governments. Engagement with 
local communities and NGOs is instead rarely taken into consideration, which obviously 
reflects Chinese firms' general inexperience and uneasiness in dealing with civil society 
representatives, in China as well as abroad. Informal and internal means to lower political risk 
exposure prevails, thanks to their lower costs, while only a very limited amount of Chinese 
firms purchase political risk insurances.8  
Despite the fact that political risk analysis ranks first among risk mitigation tools employed by 
Chinese firms, Chinese MNEs feel particularly ill equipped to evaluate risk mitigation 
strategies.9 As a Chinese scholar from the CASS acknowledged, “there is a gap of research and 
understanding of Africa in China. We haven’t fully understood Africa, African way of thinking, 
their culture, social interactions, political and religious context.”10 In fact, among 18 African 
studies centers in China reviewed in Bassan's article11, nine have been created after 1994 (and 
six of them after 2004) and only eight are not based in Beijing, proving that African studies in 
                                                             
5
 B. Ramasamy et al., "China’s outward foreign direct investments: location choice and firm ownership", Journal 
of World Business,  3/11/2010 (2010). 
6
 D. Quer, E. Claver and L. Rienda, "Political risk, cultural distance and outward foreign direct investment: 
empirical evidence from large Chinese firms", Asia Pacific Journal of Management,  pp. 1-16 (2011). 
7 
MIGA, op.cit., p. 87-89. 
8
 Idem, p. 86-88. 
9
 Idem, p. 41. 
10 
Interview with CASS scholar, Beijing, 08/03/2011.
 
11
 Bassan M., "Principaux centres et instituts chinois de recherche sur l’Afrique", Revue Outre Terre, n. 30, pp. 
379-392 (2011) 
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
89 
China are still rather undeveloped and centralized but clearly expanding. Certain Chinese 
lawyer firms have launched specific projects to advise Chinese firms investing abroad but these 
programs have not always been successful. According to a lawyer firm from the Zhejiang 
province, “most of Zhejiang enterprises going to Africa are SMEs and, in order to assess the 
risk of investing abroad, they rely on personal networks and diasporas, rather than lawyers, 
mainly for cost reasons”. However, “more Chinese companies investing abroad will have 
problems in the future so they will be more likely to ask legal advices.”12 These comments 
highlight a clear need to incentive African studies in China, to develop Chinese understanding 
of African issues and to connect this expertise with the industrial world. 
4. THE LIBYAN TURMOIL AND ITS IMPACT ON POLITICAL RISK 
DEBATE IN CHINA 
Among political risks, risks related to political violence are the first concern for Chinese 
investors in Africa. As a consequence, recent uprisings in North Africa and Middle East surely 
had an important impact on Chinese firms' and political elites' visions of political risk. This 
paragraph illustrates in particular which has been the impact of the Libyan turmoil on Chinese 
firms' activities and investments in that country.  
According to statistics released by China's Ministry of Commerce, 75 Chinese companies, 
including 13 SOEs, have invested in 50 projects in Libya since 2007. 13  Chinese FDI 
commitments have totaled on the order of US$ 9-13 billion, of which the vast majority was in 
the civil construction sector (i.e. housing development, railway construction, oil services and 
communications).14 As the unrest spread, Chinese companies suspended their operations one 
after the other and many construction sites were looted and abandoned. Although China’s role 
as a contractor has limited its exposure to direct losses in the unrest, some Chinese assets like 
Sinopec refineries were raided and destroyed while supplies have been disrupted.15 During the 
riots, bilateral trade, which amounted to US$ 6.6 billion in 2010, was also disrupted. On March 
4th, the MFA organized an evacuation operation for 35,860 Chinese citizens.16 The cost of this 
operation is set to surpass US$ 3 billion.17 Losses therefore include, but are not limited to, 
disrupted employment of the workers, abandonment and looting of the construction sites, 
disruption of operations, disruption of trade between China and Libya and evacuation costs of 
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the Chinese expatriates. Beijing had then to deal with a messy aftermath of compensation 
claims, third party debts and re-employment of all returned workers. According to an EXIM 
Bank official, losses in Libya, which have been far more than in any other country, accounted 
for US$ 18.8 billion as in April 2011, while “nobody knows how much we have lost in total 
because of the North African turmoil”.18 At a conference in Shanghai in May, Sinosure19 
revealed that in the first three months of 2011, its reported loss claims from North Africa and 
the Middle East have risen by 167 percent over the same period of last year. China Investment 
Corporation has therefore won approval from the cabinet to inject US$ 3.1 billion into Sinosure 
at the end of May 2011.20  
What has then been the impact of these major events on dominant visions among Chinese 
officials? The following paragraph offers an overview of the ongoing debate on political risk 
due to political insecurity  and instability.  
5. THE ONGOING DEBATE 
Political and social stability are major concerns for Chinese officials from both the MFA and 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). According to a MFA official, the long term solution is 
to address the root of the problem, that is poverty, as well as to increase Chinese involvement in 
conflict resolution and management in Africa. However, “political instability in Africa won’t 
change our Going Out policy because it is endemic, it is always here and there. In this period in 
North Africa it is only lasting longer and with a more intense degree.”21 Within the MOFCOM, 
there is an ongoing debate on which measures should be adopted in order to reduce Chinese 
firms exposure to these risks. Some officials suggest to “work closely with local and Western 
companies and to establish better relations with tribal leaders because the central government 
does not always control the whole territory and the population does not have a strong feeling of 
national belonging.”22 Another official however admits that “situations of social unrest are 
beyond our expectations. So far we have no idea of how to solve this problem. The MOFCOM 
and the MFA ask Chinese enterprises to pay attention to risk, to do more accurate researches on 
the local context before investing in a certain country and to prefer some more stable 
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countries.”23 This is confirmed by an MFA official stating that “political risk is difficult to 
foresee. The Chinese government monitors the situation but specific firms might lack the 
capacity to assess this risk. We encourage firms to be more aware of this kind of risk. We 
surely should monitor the situation more closely.”24 These statements are in line with the 
already cited data on the lack of political risk expertise and anti-risk exposure programs among 
Chinese firms investing abroad, while they also reflect a certain inexperience of Chinese 
institutions in dealing with these issues at the early stage of Chinese MNEs' internationalization 
process. 
Besides MFA and MOFCOM shared concerns, we can observe that the Libyan events had a 
different impact on different branches of the Chinese administration, while the position of the 
Chinese government towards the Libyan Transitional National Council has notably evolved in 
an attempt to secure Chinese firms' access to Libyan resources and investment opportunities. 
As the rebels where gaining ground in Libya, the Chinese government feared that Chinese 
companies could be sidelined in the reconstruction phase, since China, as well as Russia, Brazil, 
India and South Africa, did not support NATO air strikes aimed at defeating Gaddafi, nor 
provided military aid to the rebels. As Wen Zhongliang, deputy head of the Chinese 
MOFCOM's trade department, affirmed in an interview in March 2011, “China hopes that after 
a return to stability, Libya will continue to protect the interests and rights of Chinese investors 
and to continue investment and economic cooperation with Libya".25 However, despite the 
colder stance of the Chinese government towards the Libyan Transitional National Council, 
EXIM Bank officials have always been convinced that Chinese enterprises were unlikely to 
lose ground in the reconstruction phase, and this for at least two reasons. On one side, the new 
Libyan government relies in oil revenues to foster reconstruction and growth and it needs to 
diversify its export markets. On the other side, before the turmoil Chinese firms in Libya were 
mainly involved in the civil construction sector, where their expertise and lower costs are even 
more appreciated in the reconstruction phase. Although aware of the disruptive economic 
effects of the Libyan war for Chinese firms, a well placed EXIM Bank official has affirmed that 
losses would be fully recovered in the reconstruction phase and that “troubles will however end 
and there will be even more business to do with the reconstruction”.26  
The Libyan case might, indeed, have had a more serious impact on the MFA's perceptions of 
political risk. Although it is not the first time that Chinese nationals found themselves in danger 
on the African continent, it was in Libya that the MFA organized its first large scale rescue 
operation of Chinese nationals. If these operations become more frequent, the MFA, who is in 
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charge of them, might become particularly worried with their massive organizational and 
financial costs. Finally, it is interesting to notice that these events could even lead to some new 
form of cooperation between China and Europe. In fact, although it is common opinion among 
European officials in China that Chinese companies often disregard political risk when it comes 
to their investment choices, they also consider that, since Chinese nationals and companies 
have recently been victims of African insecurity, Chinese rising concerns on political risk 
might offer an entry point for specific Euro-Chinese cooperation initiatives in the security 
field.27 Conflict prevention and arms control policies have been cited by European officials as 
promising area for cooperation with the EU.28 Some Chinese officials from the MFA seemed 
to share the same view when they affirmed that “peace, security and stability are among the 
major common interests of China and the EU in Africa, because they both have to protect their 
investments. Cooperation in this area should better take place under the UN framework. 
However, risk analysis, the creation of an early warning system or expertise exchange and 
cooperation in rescue operations could be promising areas for bilateral cooperation between the 
EU and China, although this has never been officially discussed”. 29  Even if concrete 
Euro-Chinese cooperation initiatives in the security field haven't been launched yet, future 
developments in this area are nevertheless to be monitored. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this brief article we define what political risk is and how Chinese firms investing abroad are 
dealing with it so far, pointing out possible shortcomings in their approach, which are mainly 
due to the lack of financial means and expertise at the firm and institutional level. We tried to 
illustrate how the recent turmoil in North Africa and in Libya in particular, has affected, at 
various degrees, visions and perceptions of officials from different branches of the Chinese 
central government (MFA, MOFCOM, EXIM Bank), but we also introduced the point of view 
of European officials based in Beijing. The narrow approach of this article can however only 
offer a hint of this debate, leaving many topics, and first of all African visions of these issues, 
open to discussion.  
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